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We describe a typing system for a distributed π -calculus which guarantees that distributed agents
cannot access the resources of a systemwithout firs being granted the capability to do so. The language
studied allows agents to move between distributed locations and to augment their set of capabilities
via communication with other agents. The type system is based on the novel notion of a location type,
which describes the set of resources available to an agent at a location. Resources are themselves
equipped with capabilities, and thus an agent may be given permission to send data along a channel
at a particular location without being granted permission to read data along the same channel. We
also describe a tagged version of the language, where the capabilities of agents are made explicit in
the syntax. Using this tagged language we defin access violations as runtime errors and prove that
well-typed systems are incapable of such errors. C© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile computation, where independent agents roam widely distributed networks in search of re-
sources and information, is fast becoming a reality. A number of programming languages, APIs, and
protocols have recently emerged which seek to provide high-level support for mobile agents. These
include Java [30], Odyssey [15], Aglets [19], Voyager [24], and the latest revisions of the Internet pro-
tocol [2, 25]. In addition to these commercial efforts, many prototype languages have been developed
and implemented within the programming language research community—examples include Linda [8,
9], Facile [16], Obliq [7], Infospheres [11], the join calculus [13], and Nomadic Pict [33]. In this paper
we address the issue of resource access control for such languages.
Central to the paradigm ofmobile computation are the notions of agent, resource, and location.Agents
are effective entities that perform computation and interact with other agents. Interaction is achieved
using shared resources such as memory cells, M-structures, objects (with shared methods and state),
or communication channels. The use of the term “mobile” implies that agents are bound to particular
locations and that this binding may vary over time, i.e., agents can move. Resources, on the other hand,
are often fi ed to a single location, although proxies and mirrors may be set up in order to distribute
their contents.
In open distributed systems, such as the Internet, it is unwise to assume that all agents are benign,
and thus a certain amount of effort must be spent to ensure that vital resources are protected from
unauthorized access. This can be accomplished by using a system of capabilities and by predicating
resource access on possession of the appropriate capability. It is unreasonable, however, to expect that
every use of every resource in a system be thus verifie dynamically; such a requirement surely would
degrade system performance unacceptably. Thus it is attractive to develop static analyses, or typing
systems that guarantee controlled access to system resources.
1 First published as University of Sussex Computer Science Technical Report 98/02, Univ. of Sussex, 1998. Presented at MFPS
XIV and The 3rd International Workshop on High-Level Concurrent Languages (HLCL’98), Vol. 16(3) of Electronic Notes in
Theoretical Computer Science, Elsevier, 1998. Research funded by CONFER II and EPSRC Project GR/K60701. Author contact
information available at http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/matthewh and http://www.depaul.edu/∼jriely.
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We present a typed language for mobile agents which allows f ne control over the use of resources
in a system. We also def ne a tagged version of the language in which agents explicitly carry the sets of
capabilities which they have acquired. Using this tagged language, we capture resource access violations
as runtime errors and show that well-typed terms are incapable of such errors.
The language studied in this paper, called Dπ , is a distributed variant of the π -calculus [23], and
thus the resources of interest are channels which support binary communication between agents. We
take agents to be located threads, which are simply terms of the ordinary polyadic π -calculus [22],
extended with primitives for movement between locations and for the creation of new locations. The
language is similar to that studied by Amadio [1, 3]. There are twomajor differences: we ignore location
failure and we restrict communication to be local. The second of these differences is more important.
In Amadio’s language and in most other distributed versions of the π -calculus [13, 29], there are two
forms of movement: one for agents and another for messages, which can be seen as very simple agents
consisting only of a value that is to be communicated remotely. Here we limit mobility to a single
language construct, eliminating the possibility of remote communication without explicit movement.
The language is presented in Section 2. We give several examples of its use in Section 3.
The type system is based on the notion of location types of the form:
loc{a1 : A1, . . . , an : An}.
Here each ai is a channel name, and each Ai is a channel type. The idea is that the type of a location
embodies the sets of capabilities that an agent has at that location. If an agent knows of a location  at
type loc{a : A, b : B}, then the agent has permission to use channels a and b at , but not any other
channels. Capabilities are communicated through channels, and thus channel types may have the form
res〈L〉, which is the type for channels which communicate locations of type L.
Agents may restrict access to a resource by controlling the type of the channel over which the name
of the resource is sent. Thus if an agent sends the name  over a channel of type res〈loc{a : A, b : B}〉,
then the recipient gains access to channels a and b at . Instead, when the same name is communicated
over a channel of type res〈loc{a : A}〉, the recipient gains access only to channel a at . Of course for
such communication to be sound, the sender must have, for the value it is sending, all of the capabilities
that the channel requires. Otherwise a sender could “forge” arbitrary capabilities. To formalize this
requirement we introduce a subtyping relation on types. On location types, the subtyping relation is the
same as traditional record or object subtyping:
loc{a1 : A1, . . . , ak : Ak, . . . , an : An} <: loc{a1 : A1, . . . , ak : Ak}.
We develop the typing system in stages. In Section 4, we present a simple typing system in which
subtyping applies to locations, but not channels. Using this type system we set up the major results of
the paper: subject reduction and type-safety. These results are repeated for subsequent typing systems
as well.
In Section 5 we observe that the simple type system, while natural, is overly restrictive. An important
aspect of mobile agents is the ability to acquire capabilities from multiple sources. For example, an
agent located at  may have a capability at k which allows it to acquire additional capabilities at k.
To exercise this right, the agent may spawn a subagent to go over to k, get the new capabilities, then
come back and report. The diff culty is that when the new capabilities are received back at the original
agent, they are received with respect to a separate instance of the name k. In order to establish subject
reduction, the simple type systemmakes it impossible to use in concert capabilities acquired on different
instances of a location. Some examples which require this extra expressiveness are given in Section 3.
To overcome this limitation, we weaken the simple type system by allowing capabilities to be merged
from different instances of a location name using a match (or equality) operator “if z = k then P.”
Crucial to the new type system and to the proof of its soundness is the fact that the subtyping relation
is bounded complete; i.e., whenever two types have a common subtype they have a greatest common
subtype.
In Section 6 we extend the improved type system to a language with channel subtyping, based on
read and write capabilities. The extended type system is based on that of Pierce and Sangiorgi [26],
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who f rst studied channel subtyping for the π -calculus . Pierce and Sangiorgi’s def nition of subtyping,
however, is not bounded complete. To rectify this, we use a type language and subtyping relation which
generalize those of [26]. In this section we also augment location types with explicit capabilities for
channel creation and agent movement.
The paper concludes with a discussion of related work and open issues.
2. THE LANGUAGE
In this section we describe Dπ , def ning many auxiliary notations that are used throughout the paper.
Before describing the syntax and reduction semantics, we f rst present an example which gives an
overview of the features of the language.
A typical Dπ system is the following:
 P | (νka : A)( Q | kR).
There are three agents running in parallel:  P and  Q running at location  and kR running at
location k. Moreover Q and R share a private channel a, declared at location k. Suppose that  P has
the form:
 b?(x)P1 | c?(Y )P2.
This agent contains two subthreads, which when split will run in parallel. The f rst subthread awaits
input on channel b, whereas the second awaits input on channel c. If agent kR has the form kb!〈d〉R′,
one might expect that communication could occur between P and R on channel b. This is not the case,
however. The two instances of b refer to resources at different locations, even though they have the
same name.
To communicate with P , R must f rst move from k to  and then use b at . We write such an agent
as kgo .b!〈d〉R′. This term can reduce to  b!〈d〉R′, enabling local communication between P and
R. After the communication the system is:
 P1{|d/x |} |  c?(Y )P2 | (νka)( Q |  R′).
The asynchronous form of this idiom (where R′ is stop) is used so frequently that in Section 3 we
introduce the notation “.a!〈v〉” as shorthand for “go .a!〈v〉 stop.”
In order for kgo. b!〈d〉R′ to be well typed, it must be that the name d communicated is also located
at . To enable the communication of nonlocal names, a different syntax must be used. Suppose that
 Q now wishes to send the private name a (located remotely at k) to the agent  c?〈Y 〉P2. In this
case we must write  Q as  c!〈a@k〉Q′. We motivate this syntactic distinction in our discussion of
types in section types, values, and patterns.
2.1. Syntax
The syntax of the language is given in Fig. 1. In def ning the syntax, we presuppose the existence of a
set Var of variables, ranged over by x–z, and a set Name of names, ranged over by a–m. Both variables
and names are typed; however, since we consider different type systems in the course of the paper,
we do not report the syntax of types in Fig. 1. The type system used in Sections 4 and 5 is described
later. For the moment, suff ce it to say that names are assigned atomic types ranged over by E, which
may be either channel types, A–C, location types, K–M, or some predef ned basic types B. Variables
may additionally be assigned one of the compound or value types, ranged over by T and S. To improve
readability we usually use k–m to range over names of location type and a–c for names of channel type;
we use e–g when the type of a name is unimportant. We also routinely drop type annotations when they
are not of interest and use without comment some basic types for values such as integers and booleans.
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FIG. 1. Syntax.
Systems, Agents, and Threads. The main syntactic category is that of a system N . Intuitively, a
system consists of a set of agents running independently in parallel. An agent  P is a located thread,
where a thread is simply a term of the thread language, described below. Systems are combined using
the static combinators of the π -calculus, namely parallel composition | and restriction (νe). We further
discuss the form of the restriction operator below, after describing types.
The syntax of threads is similar to that of the synchronous polyadic π -calculus [22], with some small
extensions to deal with locations. First, locations are names and thus many of the usual operators of
the π -calculus apply to them. In particular, new locations may be created using (ν), locations may
be compared using the conditional, and locations may be communicated using the input and output
constructs. Second, we introduce a go operator that allows a thread to move from one location to
another; for example, the thread go k.P must move to location k before continuing to execute P . The
move operator is also studied by Amadio [1, 3], who writes “go k.P” as “spawn(k, P).”
All of the operators but “go” arewell known from theπ -calculus . These include the static combinators
| and (νe), as well as constructs for output u!〈v〉P , input u?〈X〉Q, (mis)matching if u = v then Q else R,
and iteration ∗P (in the literature, iteration is often written !P). Communication between agents occurs
along channels. As discussed in the example at the beginning of this section, communication is purely
local (unlike [3, 12, 29]) in that agents can only communicate with other agents at the same location,
using channels that have been allocated at that location.
In the concrete syntax, “go” has greater binding power than composition. Thus go .P | Q should be
read (go .P) | Q.We adopt several standard abbreviations. For example, we omit trailing occurrences of
stop and often denote tuples and other groups using a tilde; e.g., we may write a˜ instead of (a1, . . . , an)
and (νe˜ : E˜)P instead of (νe1 : E1) · · · (νen : En)P . We also may write “if u = v then P” instead of
“if u = v then P, else stop” and “if u = v then Q” instead of “if u = v then stop else Q.”
Types, Values, and Patterns. We view knowledge of channel a at  as a capability to use a at .
These capabilities are the basis of simple location types, which are def ned as follows:
K,L,M ::= loc{a˜ : A˜}, ai distinct.
A location type is simply a set of capabilities of the form a : A, where no two capabilities refer to
the same channel. We identify types up to reordering of capabilities and drop empty capability sets,
writing “loc” instead of “loc{}.” We also write “L, a : A” for the extension of the location type L with
the new channel a at type A. Thus loc{a : A, a : A′} is not a valid type, and if L= loc{a : A, b : B} then
L= loc{b : B, a : A} and L, c :C = loc{a : A, b : B, c : C}.
To ensure that well typing is preserved by reduction, we will require that agents receive data at
the type intended. The “intended” type is negotiated by typing the channel upon which the data are
communicated: sender and receiver must agree on the type of the communication channel. Thus channel
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types have the form
A, B, C ::= res〈T〉,
whereT is the type of data transmitted over the channel.A typical examplemight be res〈L,K〉, the type of
channel which can transmit a pair of objects, the objects having the types L andK, respectively.Wewrite
obj〈A〉 to denote the transmission type, or object type used in the channel type A; i.e., obj(res〈T〉)=T.
For simplicity, we do not allow recursive types (but see our comments in the Conclusion).
It remains only to def ne the value types T. There are two basic forms of values: channels and locations.
When a channel is communicated, it is assumed to be local; when a location is communicated, nothing
is assumed about its location (i.e., it could be the current location or not). One choice, then, would be
to allow values that are tuples of channels and locations, i.e., of type E˜, where E ::= A |K. In many
cases, however, these types are not suff ciently expressive.
For example, consider a remote procedure call in which a thread at  sends a request to a procedure
at k, then waits to receive a reply. Using this type system, the example might be written:
 go k.a!〈〉 | r?(X )Q | ka?(z : loc{r : C})go z.r !〈v〉.
Here the channel r is a response channel which the thread at k uses to reply to the request. Note that
r must be globally known to be available at . This strategy breaks down, however, if there are many
concurrent requests to the same remote procedure. In this case, one would like to be able to create a
fresh response channel for each request. One attempt is the following:
 (νr )go k.a!〈, r〉 | r?(X )Q | ka?(z : loc, x : B)go z.x!〈v〉.
However, here we have violated the principle that channel communication is local; i.e., channel r , when
communicated at k, is not local to k, but rather to .
The crucial link missing is the dependence of r on . To express this dependence, we write the
communicated value as r@ rather than (, r ). The example can now be written as
 (νr )go k.a!〈r@ 〉 | r?(X )Q | ka?(x@z : B@loc)go z.x!〈v〉.
In standard terminology, we have introduced a form of existential types, along with constructors and
destructors for those types. Thus, one can read the type “x@z : B@loc” as “z : ∃x .loc{x : B}.”
In summary, value types are of the form
T ::= A | A˜@K | T˜ | B,
where B represents some set of base types. The complete def nition of allowed types is given in Fig. 4.
In value types we sometimes use K as a shorthand for the type ( ) @K. We use the term existential
location type to refer to value types of the form (A1, . . . ,An)@K , particularly if n > 0. By contrast, the
term simple location type is reserved for types of the form K. The syntax of values and patterns, given
in Fig. 1, follows the structure of value types, providing a constructor and destructor for every type.
Following our shorthand notation for these types, in values and patterns, we treat u : K as shorthand for
( )@u : ( )@K.
Name Creation. There are two forms of private name creation in threads, for channels and locations
respectively, but in an effort to keep the syntax compact these are represented by the same syntax,
(νe : E)P . (We use the terms “name creation” and “name restriction” interchangeably.) The thread
(νe : E)P creates a new private name e of type E, called the declaration type of e, and then executes the
thread P . If E is a channel type then e is considered a channel co-located with the thread, whereas if it
is a location type K then it is considered a new location. This name creation is handled in exactly the
same way as name creation in the π -calculus; use of e is restricted to P , although during execution, P
may enlarge the scope of the restriction by outputting e.
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Binders and Substitution. We assume the standard notion of free and bound occurrences of variables
and names in systems and threads. Variables are bound by the input construct, whereas names are bound
by name creation. A term with no free variables is closed. We write fn(N ) for the function which returns
the set of free names occurring in N .
Note that channel names can appear in types and therefore they must be taken into account in the
def nition of free names. So, for example, the free names of c?(X : T)P include the names which appear
in T.
We also assume the standard notions of alpha-equivalence and substitution, where N {|u/x |} denotes
the capture-avoiding substitution of u for x in N . The notation N {|v/X |} generalizes this in an obvious
way as a sequence of substitutions. For N {|v/X |} to be well def ned, it must be that the structure of the X
matches the structure of v. No special provision is necessary for location values such as a˜@; in substi-
tution these are treated as simple tuples, e.g., N {|a@ |/x@z|} = N {| /z}{|a/x |}. Note that we have been
careful to def ne location types over channel names rather than channel identif ers, so that substitution
need not occur in types. This prevents one fromwriting, for example, a?(x@z)b?(y@w))ν : loc{x, y}),
which clearly does not make sense.
In the following we identify terms up to alpha-equivalence.
2.2. Reduction Semantics
The reduction semantics, given in Fig. 2, is def ned as a reduction relation between systems; thus
judgments are of the form
N → N ′,
where N and N ′ are (closed) system terms. Most of the rules are familiar from the π -calculus, with a
few changes to accommodate the fact that agents are explicitly located.
The main new rule is that for code movement, (R-GO), which allows an agent to move from one
location to another, say from  to k. In the semantics this is represented by termination of the thread at
 and the initiation of a new thread at k :  go k.P → kP. Note, however, that P carries with it to k
all of the capabilities that were acquired by the original agent (via substitution of names for variables).
The rule (R-COMM) for communication allows two agents running at the same location  to exchange
a value v along a common channel a:
 a!〈v〉P |  a?(X )Q →  P |  Q{|v/X |}.
It is worth emphasizing that the agents must be co-located for communication to occur. As discussed at
the beginning of this section, agents that wish to communicate on a remote channel must f rst move to
the remote location using the asynchronous “go” operation. If an agent does not wish to move, it may
spawn a new threadwhich “splits” from the agent and then performs the desiredmove or communication.
Information thus acquired may be returned to the primary agent later via communication. We discuss
this further in Example 3.4 of Section 3.
The structural equivalence [4, 22], def ned in Fig. 3, relates closed systems (N ≡ M). The purpose
of the structural equivalence is to abstract from the static structure of terms, i.e., from the irrelevant
FIG. 2. Reduction relation.
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FIG. 3. Structural equivalence.
details of the syntactic relation between composition (P|Q), restriction ((νe)P) and location ( P).
The structural equivalence is def ned to be the least equivalence relation that is closed under compo-
sition and restriction, satisf es the monoid laws for composition,2 and satisf es the axioms given in
Fig. 3.
In addition to the standard axiom for name extrusion (S-EXTR), the structural equivalence includes
axioms that allow restriction and composition to be lifted from threads to systems. The most important
of these is the rule (S-SPLIT) which allows an agent to split into two independent agents ( N |M ≡
 N | M). The rules S-GARBAGE allow for garbage collection of terminated agents, whereas S-COPY
provides a standard interpretation of iteration. Note that when a name is extracted from a thread using
S-NEW ( (νe : E)P ≡ (νe : E) P) it is necessary to record in the global restriction the location  at
which the name was def ned. In fact this will only have effect when E is a channel type.
3. EXAMPLES
In order to simplify the presentation of examples, we will assume a set of basic datatypes such
as integers and adopt a few notational conventions. In particular, we will def ne threads using the
notation
X (h, y˜) ⇐ P,
where the f rst parameter h stands for the initial location, or home, of the thread, and y˜ is an arbitrary
set of further parameters. This allows us to write X(, v˜) as shorthand for the agent   X (, v˜), i.e.,
the agent with code X (, v˜) running at location . We will also write .a!〈v〉P for the message-sending
thread go .a!〈v〉 stop |P; note that the “continuation” P is actually asynchronous with respect to the
sending of the message.
EXAMPLE 3.1 (A counter). As a f rst example, we present a simple counter which uses the global
names up, dn, and rd:
Count(h, n) ⇐ (νs : int)s!〈n〉 | ∗ up?(y@z) s?(x) (s!〈x + 1〉 | z.y!〈 〉)
| ∗ dn?(y@z) s?(x) (s!〈x − 1〉 | z.y!〈 〉)
| ∗ rd?(y@z) s?(x) (s!〈x〉 | z.y!〈x〉).
This describes a counter running at location h and initialized to the value n. The value of the counter
is stored using a private channel s. There are three public channels (or methods): up for incrementing
the stored value, dn for decrementing it, and rd for retrieving it. The def nition of the methods follows
the style typical of the asynchronous π -calculus: to invoke a method, a user creates a response channel
r , sends this response channel as argument to the method call, then awaits an answer on r . For example,
the rd method executes as follows. Upon receiving a rd request, the method reads the local state s?(x)
(thus locking the object), then re-stores the state (releasing the lock) and sends a response to the user
with the value read. For the methods up and dn, no value is returned, and thus the response simply
indicates that the operation is complete.
2 The monoid laws are N | 0 ≡ N , N | M ≡ M | N , and N | (M | O) ≡ (N | M) | O .
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Suppose that the counter is located at location cnt. Then a typical user might be coded as follows:
U (h, cnt) ⇐ (νr )cnt.up!〈r@h〉
r?( ) cnt.up!〈r@h〉
r?( ) (νt)cnt.rd!〈t@h〉
t?(x) out!〈x〉U ′.
The user increments the counter twice, then reads its value, reporting the result on the channel out
located at h. We write the combined system as
U(k, cnt) | Count (cnt, 0)
which is shorthand for:
kU(k, cnt) | cntCount(cnt, 0).
After a certain amount of reduction the user agent of this system will be able to perform the action
out!〈2〉 at location k.
EXAMPLE 3.2 (A counter server). A counter server, cS, for generating new counters can be def ned
as
cS(h) ⇐ ∗req?(x@z) (νcnt : Lc) z.x!〈cnt〉 | go cnt.Count(cnt, 0),
where Lc = loc{up : Aup, dn : Adn, rd : Ard} is the appropriate type for a counter. Upon receiving a
request, the server creates a new counter location cnt, spawns the counter code at that location, initialized
to 0, and then sends the name of the counter location to the user. If the server is at location serv, then a
client would take the form:
cUi (h) ⇐ (νr ) serv.req!〈r@h〉 | r?(z : Lc) Ui (h, z).
Now consider two clients running in parallel with the server:
cU1(k1) | cS(serv) | cU2(k2).
After a request from each of the clients to the server the system can evolve to the following state:
cS(serv) | (νcnt1)(U1(k1, cnt1) | Count(cnt1, 0))
| (νcnt2)(U2(k2, cnt2) | Count(cnt2, 0)).
(*)
Here each of the clients cUi has a copy of the counter running at a private location cnti . Note that it
would be an error if a user, say U1, were of the form:
U1(h, z) ⇐ z.compute prime factors!〈10203〉.
Such a user should be considered to be erroneous because the method compute prime factors is not
declared at the counter; only calls to the declared methods up, dn, rd are allowed.
In addition, the use of types in the language allows users to manage access to their private counters,
e.g., sending the counter to other agents with only the rd capability. Moreover these capabilities can
be managed independently by the two clients. U1, for example, may send to associates the name cnt1
with the only method rd, while U2 may, more trustingly, send cnt2 with both methods rd and up. This
selective distribution of knowledge is accomplished by typed channels, i.e., channels on which values
of a restricted type may be transmitted.
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To explain this, at least informally, suppose there are two additional agents in the system presented
in (*). Call these F1 and F2 as they are “friends” of U1 and U2, respectively. In addition, suppose that
each friend Fi has a channel ai of type res〈Li 〉, where:
L1 = loc{rd : Ard}
L2 = loc{rd : Ard, up : Aup}.
Thus each channel ai is constrained to transmit values of type Li . So when a location name is transmitted
on a1, only the permission to usemethod rd at that location is granted,whereas a2 also confers permission
to use method up. Now consider the system
N | F1(k1) | F2(k2),
where N is the system from (*) and users and their friends have the form:
Ui (h, cnt) ⇐ ai !〈cnt〉
Fi (h) ⇐ ai?(z : Li )(νr )z.up!〈r@h〉.
Then, after receiving the counter, F1 should be forbidden from proceeding, as it attempts to access the
up method of cnt1 without suff cient permission. F2, instead, should be allowed to proceed, as its use
of up is justif ed by the permissions it received for cnt2.
The general philosophy is that an agent should only use names, or resources, in accordance with
the capabilities or permissions that it has acquired for that name. In the next section we consider two
methods for imposing such constraints. The f rst is a type system which will reject the agent F1 as
untypable. The second is an augmented semantics which will report a runtime error when F1 attempts
to access the up method of cnt1.
EXAMPLE 3.3 (A local counter server). It is also possible for the server to start the counter code
within a location specif ed by the user, rather than creating a new location for this purpose. In this
case, however, conf icts on the use of the names up, etc. arise if many counters are created at the same
location. To solve this problem, the server may create fresh names for the methods of the cell, rather
than using the common names up, dn, and rd. The following code implements such a local counter
server and client:
cS′(h) ⇐ ∗req?(x@z)go z.(νu, d, r ) Countu,d,r (z, 0)
|x!〈u, d, r〉
cU′(h) ⇐ νr serv.req!〈r@h〉
| r?(u, d, r )U′(h, u, d, r ).
In this implementation, the user receives as a response not the name of a freshly allocated location, but
rather the names of three freshly allocated channels. Here we use Countu,d,r to denote the code used
in Example 3.1, with the names up, dn, rd replaced by u, d, r , respectively. Now let us consider the
system consisting of the server and two co-located clients.
cU′(k) | cS′(serv) | cU′(k)
After servicing requests from both clients this can evolve to the following:
cS′(serv) | (νu1, d1, r1)
(
U′(k, u1, d1, r1)
∣∣Count u1,d1,r1 (k, 0)
)
| νu2, d2, r2
(
U′(k, u2, d2, r2)
∣∣Count u2,d2,r2 (k, 0)
)
.
Here all of the agents, counters, and users are located at a single location k. Each user has private access
to its counter, however, due to the use of the restriction operator.
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EXAMPLE 3.4 (Remote channel creation). We now examine an implementation issue. Dπas def ned
allows an agent to create new channels only at its current location. It is often useful, however, to be able
to create channels remotely, without having to move back and forth. First we consider the special case
in which an agent creates a new location and would like to place some channels at that location at
the same time. We might introduce a new thread notation for this, T(h) ⇐ (ν(a, b)@)P , which we
take as shorthand for:
T(h) ⇐ ν go .(νa, b)go h.P.
However this is best viewed as a specif cation; as an implementation method it involves the transmission
of the continuation thread P , which may be huge, around the network. A more useful implementation
would be:
T(h) ⇐ (νr )(ν) go.(ν(a, b) go h.r !〈(a, b)@〉
| r?((x, y)@z)P{|(x, y)@z/(a, b)@|}.
Here the new location  with associated channels is created and then sent back to the main agent at h;
the sending of the potentially large continuation P across the network is avoided.
This implementation schema can also be adapted to the generation of new channels at an existing
location, say , simply by removing the restriction (ν):
T(h) ⇐ go.(νa, b) go h.P.
We use the notation ν(a, b)P to abbreviate this idiom. A lightweight implementation then might be:
T(h) ⇐ (νr )go.(νa, b) go h.r !〈(a, b)@〉
|r?((x, y)@z) ifz =  then P{|(x, y)@z)/(a, b)@|}.
This example raises some interesting issues concerning the type system, which are discussed at length
in Section 5.
EXAMPLE 3.5 (Routed forwarding). Finally, we develop a longer program. We write a program
Forwarder(in@h, s@d) which establishes a connection between the local channel in and the (possibly
remote) channel s. By “connection” we mean that messages sent into in should eventually f nd their
way to the service channel s at destination d . Such a program is trivial to write in Dπ :
∗in?(x) go d.s!〈x〉.
The unpleasant part of the problem specif cation is that we are not allowed to assume that there is a
direct connection from the current location to d. Instead, the program must consult the local method
route(d) which returns the name of the neighboring location that is closest to d , i.e., somewhere between
the current location and d .
Tomake the program readable, we assume some additional syntactic conventions, including recursive
def nitions, let-expressions, and the notation for remote channel creation introduced in the previous
example. The Forwarder can be implemented as follows:
Forwarder(in@h, s@d) ← if h = d then
∗in?(x) s!〈x〉
else
let n ← route(d)
in (νnc) go n.Forwarder(c@n.s@d)
| ∗ in?(x) go n.c!〈x〉
endif
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When the Forwarder is started, it checks to see if the destination d is the same as the current location
h. If h and d are the same, then there is no need for routing, and the program can simply set up a
forwarding process from in to s: “∗in?(x) s!〈x〉.” If h and d are different, then the name of a neighbor
n is retrieved, where n is between h and d on the network. Then a new copy of the code is started at n,
and a forward process is set up between in and n.
4. TYPES
In this section we def ne a typing relation for the language presented in Section 2 and show that it
is sound. To prove soundness, one normally proves two properties: subject reduction and type safety.
Subject reduction says simply that well-typedness is preserved by reduction; i.e., if N is well typed and
N → N ′ then N ′ is also well typed. Intuitively, type safety asserts that a well typed term “does nothing
bad”; combined with subject reduction it guarantees that a term can never do the “bad” thing. What
exactly is bad varies from one language to another. In the lambda calculus, the bad thing may be to
reach an irreducible form that is not canonical; thus the type safety theorem states that if a term is well
typed, then either it is canonical or it can reduce.
In reactive languageswhich lack such canonical forms, such as the polyadicπ -calculus , the statement
of type safety is more delicate. Milner [22] describes type safety as freedom from arity mismatches.
For example, the system
 c!〈a, b〉 |  c?(z : loc)go z.Q
gives rise to a runtime error because the f rst thread sends a pair of channels, whereas the second
expects a singleton location. This def nition of type safety is related to that for the lambda calculus:
arity matching is required for substitution (and therefore the reduction rule (R-COMM) to be def ned.
Type safety forπ -calculi with capabilities was f rst studied by Pierce and Sangiorgi [26]; we presented
an alternative formulation in [27], which we now recount. The basic idea is that every instance of a name
is tagged with certain capabilities and each instance may only be used as its capabilities allow; attempts
to use a name without the proper capability result in runtime error. For the simple type language of
Section 2.1, only locations need be tagged, and each instance of a location must be tagged with the set
of channel names available to that instance. For example, the name {a,b} is an instance of location  at
which only the channels a and b may be used. Thus, the term {a,b}c!〈a〉 would produce a runtime
error since c is used at  without permission.
The key to such a tagged semantics is the rule for tagged communication. The rule must capture the
fact that when an instance of a name is communicated, the permissions it carries may be reduced. Thus
in the reduction
{c}
[[
c!〈k{a,b}〉
]] ∣∣ {c}
[[
c?(z : loc{a : A})Q]] → {c}
[[Q{
∣∣k{a}/
z
∣∣}]]
k is received with the capability to use only channel a; i.e., the tagged value k{a} is substituted for z in
Q. The tag for channel b is removed since the receiving thread has not explicitly requested a location
with capability b, but rather a location z of type loc{a : A}. Thus, if Q has the form goz.b!〈v〉, then a
runtime error would occur when Q attempts to communicate on b.
This form of error is related to errors which occur in untyped languages with object or record types:
if method b is requested of an object instance that does not provide method b, a runtime error occurs.
The tagged system is even more discriminating, however, because it may be an error to request b even
at objects which do, in fact, provide b: it is also important that the particular agent requesting b has
received the capability (or permission) to use b.
The section proceeds as follows. First, we describe the subtyping relation. Section 4.2 then def nes the
typing relation and presents subject reduction. The following subsection presents a series of examples
displaying the use of types. Section 4.4 describes the tagged language and proves type safety. The tagged
language improves on the one sketched above: rather than tag instances of names with capabilities, we
tag agents; thus as agents roam the system, their accumulated capabilities are explicitly recorded.
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FIG. 4. Simple types.
4.1. Subtyping
Figure 4 recalls the def nition of simple types fromSection 2.1 and presents the def nition of subtyping
for these types (it is the least relation that satisf es the f ve rules given). A location capability has the
form a : A, i.e., a channel a of type A. Then we say that L is a supertype of K if every capability of L is
also a capability of K.We use the obvious notation a : A∈K to indicate that location type K contains the
capability a : A. Extending this view of location types as sets of capabilities, subtyping can be expressed
simply as reverse inclusion:
K <: L if K ⊇ L.
(Recall that we identify location types up to reordering of capabilities.) As an example, note that
loc{a : A, b : B} <: loc{a : A}. For simplicity of exposition, in this section there is nonontrivial subtyping
on channel types; we study these in Section 6.
It is easy to show that <: forms a preorder on types (i.e., <: is ref exive and transitive); in fact it
is a partial order, but for the sake of generality we use preorders. This subtyping relation also has an
interesting property which will play a crucial role in Section 5: it is finite bounded complete, or FBC.
DEFINITION 4.1. We say that a preorder (S, ) is finite bounded complete if for every f nite nonempty
subset S ⊆ S, if S has a lower bound then S has a greatest lower bound. That is, there exists a partial meet
operator  that satisf es the following property. Let R ∈ S and S ⊆ S, where S is f nite and nonempty; if
for every si ∈ S, R  si (i.e., R is a lower bound of S) then S is def ned and:
• S  si , for all si ∈ S and
• R  S.
To show that a preorder is f nite bounded complete it suff ces to def ne a partial binary meet operator 
that is commutative and associative and satisf es the conditions of Def nition 4.1 on pairs.3 The binary
operator can then be lifted to nonempty f nite sets in the obvious way:
S = s1  s2  · · ·  sn where si ∈ S.
DEFINITION 4.2. We def ne a partial binary operator  over the types of Fig. 4. The def nition is by
induction on the structure of types.
loc{a˜ : A˜}  loc{b˜ : B˜} = loc{a˜ : A˜, b˜ : B˜} if ∀i, j : ai = b j implies Ai = B j
A  A = A
B  B = B
T˜  S˜ = (T1  S1, . . . ,Tn  Sn)
A˜@K  B˜@L = (A˜  B˜)@(K  L)
3 By commutativity, we mean if T S is def ned, then ST is def ned and T S ≶ ST, where ≶ is the kernel of <:
(T ≶ S iff T <: S and S <: T). Similarly, by associativity we mean if (T S)R is def ned then T (SR) is def ned and
(T S)  R ≶ T  (SR).
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The only nontrivial case in the def nition is that for location types. For channel types the meet is
undef ned except when the types are identical; A  B is undef ned if A = B. At other value types it is
simply a homomorphic extension, strict in undef nedness. Note that the meet is only def ned for types
that have the same structure and for which all constituent components have a meet. Thus (A,B)  (A)
is undef ned, as is loc{a : A}  loc{a : B}, if A = B.
PROPOSITION 4.3. The operator  defined above is a partial meet operator.
Proof. By induction on the structure of types (and thus on the def nition of ), it is straightforward
to establish that  is commutative, is associative, and satisf es the constraints of Def nition 4.1 for all
pairs of types.
4.2. A Simple Type System
Type Environments. The primary judgments of the type system will be of the form   N where
 is a type environment and N is a system term; the judgment   N is read “the term N is well
typed with respect to environment .” The purpose of the type environment is to provide a type for
all of the free identif ers in N . Since the type system is static and therefore must be def ned over open
terms, type environments must provide types for variables in addition to names. The type environment
thus provides a view of every free identifier, where the type (indeed the existence) of a channel name
or variable depends upon its location. We allow variables to receive values other than simple names;
so in addition to channel and location types, a variable may have a tuple type T˜, or an existential type
(A1, . . . ,An)@L (where n is greater than zero). Given these considerations, we take type environments
to be maps from identif ers to open location types, which have the form loc{u˜ : T˜}. By contrast, the
location types of Section 2.1 (loc{a˜ : A˜}) are referred to as closed. As an example, the following is a
type environment:
 = { : loc{a : A, x : B}, z : loc{a : A′}}.
We write (w) to refer to the type of the location w in  and (w, u) to refer to the type of the
channel or variable u at location w. So for  as def ned above, (z)= loc{a : A′} and (, x) = B,
whereas (z, x) is undef ned.
Weuse the samemetavariables (K-M) to range over both open and closed location types. It is important
to remember, however, that open types may only appear in type environments; all types in terms are
closed. Thus, substitution of values into terms has no effect on the types that may appear in those
terms.
The subtyping relation is extended in the obvious manner from closed to open location types, us-
ing open location capabilities of the form u : T. Both subtyping and the partial meet operator extend
pointwise to environments. For subtyping we have:
 <:  iff ∀w ∈ dom() :(w) <: (w).
The partial meet operator    is undef ned if (w) (w) is undef ned for some w ∈ dom()∩
dom(); otherwise:
   = {w : L | (w)  (w) = L}
∪ {w : L | (w) = L and w /∈ dom()}
∪ {w : L | (w) = L and w /∈ dom()}.
For example, if K  K′ is def ned then:
{ : L, k : K}  {k : K′, m :M} = { : L, k : K  K′, m :M}.
Environment Extension. We use,(w) {w : K} to represent the environment augmented by the new
entry which maps the identif er w to the location type K; this is only def ned if w is new to ; i.e., w is
not already in the domain of .
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We use a similar notation for identif ers at other types: ,(u) {wu : T} augments the type of w in 
with the new capability u : T; to be def ned w must already be in the domain of  and u must be new to
(w). For example, taking  as def ned previously, we have
 = { : loc{a : A, x : B}, z : loc{a : A′}}
,(x) {z x : B′} = { : loc{a : A, x : B}, z : loc{a : A′, x : B′}},
whereas,(x) {x : B′} is undef ned. This notation extends structurally to values.4 For example, consider
 as above and let L= loc{a : A′′}; then we have:
,((x,y@w)) {z(x, y@w) : (B′,C@L)}
= { : loc{a : A, x : B}, z : loc{a : A′, x : B′}, w : loc{a : A′′, y : C}}.
In the new environment, z is augmented with the extra capability x : B′, and w is introduced as a new
location with capabilities a : A′′ and y : C. By way of contrast, consider:
,((x,y)) {z(x, y) : (B′,C@L)} = { : loc{a : A, x : B}, z : loc{a : A′, x : B′, y : C@L}}.
Here the existential location value y of type C@L is not fully deconstructed. When studying the type
system, note that little can be done with identif ers such as y; in fact they can only be used in output
values.
The Typing System. The typing system is given in Fig. 5. The def nition uses auxiliary judgments
for threads, identif ers, and values. For threads, judgments have the form  w P , indicating that the
thread P is well typed to run at location w, where w ∈ dom (). Finally, channels and other values
are typed using judgments of the form  w v : T, which indicates that the value v is well formed at
w and has at least the capabilities specif ed by T. Recall that in values, we treat u : L as shorthand for
( )@u : ( )@L. Location types, both simple and existential, are independent of the location w at which
they are typed.
The heart of the typing system is the rules for threads and in particular the rules for communicating
terms, (T-W) and (T-R). For example, to deduce that u!〈v〉Q is well typed to run at location w
 w u!〈v〉Q
it is necessary to establish
•  w v : T, i.e., v is a well-formed value at w with capabilities specif ed by some type T,
•  w u : res〈T〉, i.e., u is a channel at location w which may communicate values of type T,
and
•  w Q, i.e., Q is well typed to run at w.
The input construct is similar. To deduce  w u?(X : T)Q we must, as before, establish that u is a
channel of type res〈T〉 at location w, but in deducing that Q is well typed we may use the augmented
environment ,(X ) {w X : T}.
In the rule for code movement, (T-GO), the location of the thread changes: to type  w go u.P one
must ensure that P is well typed at u, not w; therefore the premise is  u P . The remaining rules
4 Formally, the def nition is as follows.
,(u) {wu : T} =   {w : loc{u : T}} if w ∈ dom() and u /∈ dom((w))
,(v˜) {wv˜ : T˜} = ,((v1) {w(v1 : T1)}  · · · ,((vn ) {w(vn : Tn)}
,((v˜@u)) {w(v˜@u) : (A˜@K)} = ,(u) {u : K},(v˜) {u v˜ : A˜} if u /∈ dom()
Note that an environment cannot be extended with a location that is already def ned. Also note that for ,(v) {wu : T} to be def ned,
w must already be def ned in . Thus ,((a˜@w)) {w(a˜@w) : (A˜@K)} is undefined for any  and w.
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FIG. 5. A type system.
for threads are straightforward. The rules for (mis)matching are standard. The rules for name creation
(T-NEW) simply augment the typing environment in the appropriate manner. Note that because of our
notation for extending environments location types are independent of the location w at which they are
typed. The other rules are purely structural.
The extension to systems is also straightforward. The only interesting rule is (N-RUN) for located
threads, which has the same structure as (T-GO). The remaining rules are structural rules, similar to those
for threads.
Properties of Typing. We now sketch some results related to the typing system of Fig. 5. The
following property is immediate from the def nition of subtyping.
LEMMA 4.4 (Type specialization). If  w v : T and T <: S then  w v : S.
The following proposition states that well-typing is preserved when the typing environment is aug-
mented; for the proof see the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 4.5 (Weakening). If   N and  <:  then   N.
In Lemma A.2 of the Appendix we show that the type environment may also be diminished by
removing identif ers that do not occur free in the term being typed.
THEOREM 4.6 (Subject reduction).
(a) If N ≡ N ′ then   N if and only if   N ′.
(b) If   N and N → N ′ then   N ′.
As is often the case, the proof of subject reduction depends heavily on a substitution lemma:
LEMMA 4.7 (Substitution). If  w v : T and ,(X ) {w X : T} u then  u{v/X} P{|v/X |}.
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There is no result for substitution in systems since substitution always occurs at the level of threads.
The proofs of these results are in the Appendix.
4.3. Examples
We now consider some simple type inferences. As a f rst example consider the single agent:
N =  c?(z : K) go z.a!〈v〉.
At location , N receives location z on channel c, then moves to z and calls method a. To be well typed
relative to  it is certainly necessary for ( ) to have the form loc{c : res〈loc{a : Av, . . . }〉, . . . }, where
Av is the type res〈TV 〉 and TV is the type of v. This typing ensures that N does not cause a runtime
error. For example, let:
M = kgo .c!〈k〉 | a?(x)Q.
If(k) has the form loc{a : Av, . . . }, then the agents N and M can communicate in the combined system
(N | M). The f rst subagent of M moves to  and communicates with N ; the second subagent of M
waits at k for the response.
Here there is an a priori agreement between the two agents that any location transmitted on c will
have a publicly available channel a. It is often desirable to generate new channels, as described in
Example 3.3. Such an agent is the following M ′:
M ′ = k (νb : Av) go .c!〈b@k〉|b?(x)Q.
Here a new channel b of the appropriate type is generated and the structured value b@k is transmitted.
The corresponding version of the f rst thread is
N ′ =  c?(x@z : Av@loc) go z.x!〈v〉.
Rather than communicating over the public channel a, the threads use the private channel b, which is
bound to x in the receiver. The use of structured values (or existential types, if you prefer) is essential to
get N ′ to be well typed; the analysis of the thread go z. x!〈v〉 is performed in an environment in which
the identif er z is known to contain the capability x : Av . Note that these agents may even be well typed
in an environment where k has no known capabilities (i.e., (k) = loc).
A mixture of public and private channels is possible by combining the mechanisms of the previous
two examples; for example:
N ′′ =  c?(x@z : Tz) go z.(x!〈v〉|a?〈y〉P)
M ′′ = k(νb : Av) go .c!〈b@k〉|b?(x) a!〈x〉Q.
Suppose that Tz = Av@loc{a : Av}. Again a new channel b is generated and the value v is bounced
back and forth at k using b and the public channel a.
We f nish with some examples of systems that cannot be typed. The simplest case is the misuse of a
channel. The system
 c?(x) go x .P | k go .c!〈a, b〉Q
is not typable in any typing environment. The two agents make inconsistent requirements on the type of
the channel c at the location . The f rst demands a type of the form res〈loc〉 while the second requires
a type of the form res〈Ta,Tb〉.
A more interesting example is the following:
 c?(x@z ) (νa) d!〈x, a@z〉.
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This agent inputs a location z with channel x , then allocates a channel at , and then attempts to send z
with the channels x and a. This term is clearly unsound when a location other than  is sent on c; i.e.,
channel a is not known to be available at z. A similar problem occurs in the term:
 c?(x@z ) if x = a then Q′.
This term cannot be typed because the matching rule (T-EQ) requires that the two identif ers being
compared (x and a) be located at , and x is not known to be located at .
Finally, suppose  is a type environment in which (k, c)= res〈loc{a : A}〉. Then the agent
kc?(z) go z.b!〈v〉 cannot be typed relative to . To do so it would be necessary to type b!〈v〉 at
location z : loc{a : A}.
4.4. The Tagged Language and Type Safety
We now formalize a suitable notion of runtime error for our language and prove that well-typed
systems are free of such errors. To do so, the language must be enriched with permissions; a runtime
error occurs, then, when a name is used without permission. In [27] we def ned such an enriched
language by placing tags on every instance of a name. Here we take an alternative approach, which we
feel is conceptually and notationally simpler. Rather than tag every instance of a name, we tag threads;
thus as a thread evolves, its accumulated capabilities are explicitly recorded. A runtime error occurs if
a thread attempts to use a name contrary to the limitations imposed by these explicit capabilities.
The syntax and semantics of the tagged language are given in Fig. 6. The syntax of threads and values
is unchanged from that of Fig. 1; only the system level is affected, and here only the clause for agents.
Each agent of the original language  P is tagged with a closed type environment  which represents
the capabilities (or permissions) of the agent. For example, the agent
 P{ : loc{a : A,b : B},k : loc{a : A′}}
has knowledge of resources a and b at  and of resource a at k. In addition to recording the names of
available resources, the tag also records the permissions that the agent has acquired for the use of that
resource (the types A, B, and A′). This additional information allows f ne control in the def nition of
runtime error.
The reduction semantics of Section 2.2 is adapted to show how tags evolve over time. To avoid
confusion, we write N → N ′ for tagged reduction. The only nontrivial change is to the rule (R-COMM).
FIG. 6. The tagged language.
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Before discussing it, we brief y describe the changes to the other rules. First consider the structural
equivalence reported in Fig. 6. In the rules (RT-SPLIT) and (RT-ITR), note that when an agent splits,
each of the newly created child agents takes a copy of the capabilities provided by the parent; e.g.,
 P|Q ≡  P| Q . Note also that when a private name becomes public (ST-NEW) the agent is
given the capability to use the once private name.
In the reduction rules (RT-GO) and (RT-EQ), agents preserve their capabilities as they reduce. Only
in rule (ST-COMM) are capabilities modif ed. The rule uses the notation “{v : T}” which def nes a type
environment in which the names in v are assigned the types in T at  . For example:5
{(a, b@k) : (A,B@loc{c : C})} = { : loc{a : A}, k : loc{c : C, b : B}}.
In the rule (RT-COMM), which states
 a!〈v〉P |  a?(X : T)Q →  P |  Q{|v/X |}{ v:T},
there are two agents at : one willing to send the value v and the other waiting to receive a value
into x . Recall that obj (A) denotes the transmission type, or object type, used in the channel type A;
i.e., obj (res〈T〉)=T. The capabilities offered by the sender are determined by obj ((, a)), i.e., the
type that the sender assigns to channel a. The capabilities expected by the receiver are determined by
the reception type T, which must be a supertype of obj ((, a)). If the sender is unwilling to send
suff cient capabilities to satisfy the receiver (i.e., obj ((, a)) <:/ T), then a runtime error will occur; we
discuss this later. Otherwise the communication proceeds and, after receiving the value v, the receiver’s
capability set is augmented with the capabilities specif ed by v and T at .
As an example, let T= C@ loc in the following tagged system:
 a!〈c@k〉 P{... , k:loc{b:B,c:C}}| a?(x@z : T) Q{... , k:loc{d:D}}.
After the communication the system is:
 P{..., k : loc{b:B,c:C}}| Q{|c@k/x@z|}{..., k:loc{d:D,c:C}}.
The receptor has gained capabilities through this communication, as mediated through the reception
type T.
The typing system is extended to the tagged language simply by changing the rule (N-RUN), as shown
in Fig. 6. To help distinguish tagged and untagged systems, we use the symbol  when writing typing
judgments for tagged systems. (On threads and values the syntax and typing systems are identical.) To
infer    P it must be the case that  <:  and   P . The f rst requirement simply verif es
that the tags are consistent with the global types specif ed in . The second requirement guarantees that
the agent uses the resources in the system only as it is allowed. Consider:
ka!〈 〉{...,k:loc{c:C}}.
Here the agent is attempting to use the channel a at k, which it is not permitted to do. This term cannot
be well typed, even under a type environment that def nes channel a at k.
THEOREM 4.8 (Tagged subject reduction). If   M and M → M ′ then   M ′.
The proof of subject reduction is similar to the proof for the untagged language; the details are in the
Appendix.
5 The notation {v : T} is def ned by induction on v similarly to the def nition of ,(v) {wv : T}.
{u : T} = { : loc{u : T}}
{u : T˜} = {u1 : T1}  · · ·  {un : Tn}
{µ˜@w : A˜@K} = {w : K}  {w u˜ : A˜}
Some properties of this def nition are stated in Lemma A.6 of the Appendix.
100 HENNESSY AND RIELY
Before describing runtime error, we establish that tagged and untagged reduction are closely related.
To do this, we def ne a function tag which takes a (closed) system in the untagged language and
returns the set of tagged terms which can safely be derived from it using . Throughout the rest of this
discussion we will use N to range over untagged terms and M to range over tagged terms. The function
tag is def ned on the structure of systems as follows:
tag(0) = {0}
tag( P) = { P |  <:  and   P}
tag(P1 | P2) = {Q1|Q2 | Qi ∈ tag Pi }
tag((νe : E)N ) = {(νe : E)M | M ∈ tag(,(e){e:E})(N )}.
The def nition of tag(N ) is adapted directly from the rules for typing tagged systems; therefore the
following lemma can be trivially verif ed:
LEMMA 4.9.
(a) tag(N ) is nonempty if and only if   N.
(b) If M ∈ tag(N ) then   M.
Note that a well-typed system can be regarded as a tagged system in which the tags on threads can be
intuitively, and automatically, inferred from the typing. If we know that the system is well typed with
respect to , then the function tag can be determinized, thus providing a method for generating such
a term. To do so, we need only simplify the rule for agents to tag( P) = { P}. We will write
tag

(N ) to refer to this determinized version of the function.
The following proposition shows that tagged and untagged reduction can be considered interchange-
able.
PROPOSITION 4.10. Suppose M ∈ tag N , then
(a) N → N ′ implies ∃M ′ : M ′ ∈ tag(N ′) : M → M ′
(b) M → M ′ implies ∃ N ′ : M ′ ∈ tag(N ′) : N→ N ′.
Proof. In both cases, one must f rst establish a similar result for the structural equivalence, using
the subject reduction results for the structural equivalence. The main results can then be verif ed. The
proof is by induction on the def nition of reduction, using the subject reduction theorems for the tagged
and untagged semantics. The proof is simple and tedious and left to the interested reader.
Runtime Errors. Intuitively, a runtime error occurs whenever an agent uses a name contrary to
the capabilities it has acquired for that name. This informal idea is readily formalized in the tagged
language. The def nition is given in Fig. 7 as a unary predicate over tagged systems N err−→. We write
N err−→/ for ¬(N err−→). For example, the rule (E-EQ) states that it is an error for an agent to attempt
to compare two channel names that do not belong at the current location. There is no rule for the
“go” operator, because in the current context there are no errors associated with that operator (but see
Section 6).
FIG. 7. Runtime errors.
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The most interesting axioms are for communication. These use the notation (v) to denote the least
type, if any, which the typing environment  can assign to the value v at . (v) is def ned inductively
on the structure of v:
(a) = (, a)
(v@k) = k(v)@(k)
((v1, . . . , vn)) = ((v1), . . . , (vn)).
As usual, (v) is strict in undef nedness; for example, if a /∈ dom{()}, then ((a, b)) is undef ned.
One can easily check the following lemma.
LEMMA 4.11. For any value v, if   v : T then (v) is defined and (v) <: T, and therefore by
Lemma 4.4   v :(v).
The simplest form of communication error is an arity mismatch; i.e., the sent value v cannot be typed
at the reception type T. As discussed in Section 4.3, such errors in our setting include senders which
communicate values without suff cient permission or receivers that attempt to secretly “bump up” the
capabilities on a received name. A simple rule for communication errors might thus be:
 a!〈v〉P |  a?(X : T)Q(N ) err−→ if (v) <:/ T.
This rule requires that the sender have all of the permissions on v that the receiver requests (via T).
While this rule prevents senders from making up capabilities, it does not keep receivers from doing so.
For example, let
A = res〈loc{b : B}〉
and suppose (, c) = res〈A〉. Then using the rule proposed above, the system
 (νa : A) c!〈a〉 a!〈k〉 |  c?(x : A) x?(z : loc{b : B, d : D}) Q
will not produce an error, as long as (k) actually has the b and d capabilities. However, the receiving
agent has clearly gained more capabilities at k than the sender intended (indeed, more capabilities from
the sender has itself), namely access to d . The problem here is that the intermediary role of channel a
is ignored.
To avoid such problems more ref ned rules are required. We use those given in Fig. 7. Using these
rules (in particular (E-RCV)), note that the agent
 c?(x : A) x?(z : loc{b : B, d : D}) Q
will produce an error after its f rst input.
With this motivation, let us discuss each of the rules in turn. There are three different reasons why a
runtime error might occur due to communication.
• The sender attempts to forge capabilities. Rule (E-SND) says that v may not be sent on a if a
requires more capabilities than available at v. Thus an error occurs if the sender’s view of the value to
be sent does not satisfy the requirements of (the sender’s view) of the communication channel a. Note
that this includes the possibility that (, a) is not def ned; i.e., the sender has no a capability at .
• The receiver attempts to forge capabilities. Rule (E-RCV) says that a sender may not assign a
received value more capabilities than are allowed by a. Thus an error occurs if the receiver’s view of
the value to be received exceeds the capabilities of (the receiver’s view) of the values communicated
on channel a. Again this includes the case when (, a) is undef ned.
• The sender and receiver cannot agree on the use of a. Rule (E-COMM) precludes this possibility.
Thus an error occurs if the sender’s view of channel a is incompatible with the receiver’s view.
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The interested reader is invited to check that the examples of systems which cannot be typed, given
at the end of the last section, can all formally give rise to runtime errors.
Taken together, the rules say that in order for the system
 a!〈v〉P |  a?(X : T)Q
to avoid runtime error, each of the following constraints must be satisf ed:
(v) <: obj((, a)) <: obj((, a)) <: T.
THEOREM 4.12 (Type safety).   M implies M err−→/ .
Proof. We prove the contrapositive, namely M err−→ implies that for no  can we prove   M .
The proof proceeds by induction on the def nition of M err−→. For the rule involving the structural
equivalence, we use the subject reduction theorem, which states that if M ≡ M ′ then   M iff   M ′.
The other cases are all straightforward. We present a representative case, (E-SND). The rule states:
 a!〈v〉P err−→ if  (v) <:/ obj ((, a)).
By way of contradiction, assume that    a!〈v〉P . We show that from this premise we may
conclude  (v) <: obj ((, a)), leading to a contradiction.
Using the premise and the rule (NT-RUN), we have that   a!〈v〉P . This judgment can only be
achieved using (T-W), and therefore we have that   a : res〈T〉, v : T for some T. Using Lemma 4.11,
we therefore may conclude that  (v) <: T. Using similar reasoning, we have res〈T〉 = (, a), and
thus T = obj((, a)). We therefore may conclude that  (v) <: obj((, a)), as desired.
The type safety and subject reduction theorems ensure that well-typed systems do not give rise
to runtime errors. Specif cally if   N then we can take N to represent the tagged term tag

(N ).
Proposition 4.10 ensures that N and tag

(N ) have essentially the same reduction sequences. Moreover,
if tag

(N ) →∗ M ′ then M ′ err−→/ . This later property follows from a more general corollary:
COROLLARY 4.13.
(a) If   N and N →∗ N ′ then tag(N ′) is nonempty.
(b) M ′ ∈ tag(N ′) implies M ′ err−→/ .
(c) If M ∈ tag(N ) and M →∗ M ′ then M ′ err−→/ .
Proof. (a) follows fromProposition 4.10, since  N implies that tag(N ) is nonempty. (b) follows
from Lemma 4.9b and Theorem 4.12. (c) follows from Lemma 4.9b, Theorem 4.8 (using induction on
→∗), and Theorem 4.12.
5. AN IMPROVED TYPING SYSTEM
Here we argue that the typing system of the previous section is too restrictive and suggest a simple
modif cation which enables a much larger class of systems to be typed.
Consider the following thread:
a?(x1@z1 : T1) b?(x2@z2 : T2) goz1.d!〈x1, x2〉.
This thread cannot be typed, and reasonably so, as it can easily give rise to runtime errors. The thread
receives location z1 with private channel x1 and location z2 with private channel x2. The variables z1
and z2 may, of course, be bound to different locations at runtime; nonetheless, the thread attempts to
use x2 as though it were local to z1 providing the potential for a runtime error.
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If the use of x2 at z1 is guarded by the condition z1 = z2, however, no such runtime error can occur:
R def= a?(x1@z1 : T1) b?(x2@z2 : T2) if z1 = z2 then go z1.d!〈x1, x2〉. (*)
Assuming that for some Ei , the types Ti satisfy the constraints
T1 <: E1@loc{d : res〈E1,E2〉} T2 <: E2@loc. (**)
Then this term (more formally, a tagged version of it) can never give rise to a runtime error. The output
on d is only ever executed when it has been established that the two received channels are at the same
location. Nonetheless, our type system will reject it. The reason is that the rule for matching takes no
notice of a match:
 w u : T, v : T, P, Q
 w if u = v then P else Q .
To type “if u = v then P else Q” the subterms P and Q must be well typed with respect to the original
type environment .
Consider the thread R given in (*). Suppose that we are attempting to prove that   R, where
the Ti which appear in R are the greatest types that satisfy (**) (i.e., take the inequations in (**) to be
equations). Then when typing the subterm d!〈x1, x2〉 of R we are obliged to show
,(z1) {z1 : loc{d, x1}},(z2) {z2 : loc{x2}} z1 d!〈x1, x2〉
but this clearly is not provable since x2 is undef ned at z1.
There are safe ways to type such terms, however. One approach would be to augment the type
environment with an equivalence relation between types. The solution we adopt, instead, extends the
def nition of the typing relation (Fig. 5) with one additional rule, given in Fig. 8. We write  ′ N to
indicate that N is well typed using this slightly weaker typing system; similarly we write  ′ M , if
M is tagged. Whereas the use of an equivalence relation in the type system is somewhat more general,
our approach has the advantage of simplicity and is suff cient for all of the examples we have found.
The new typing system improves over the old by replacing (T-EQ)with the new rule (T-EQ′) formatching
identif ers. In the old type system, matching is “a no-op” in the sense that the fact that two identif ers
have been found to be equal provides no advantage to the thread that makes the match. The new rule
allows the system to type threads that do take advantage of a match.
(T-EQ′) states that the thread if u = v then Pelse Q is well typed to run at w, relative to , Q is well
typed with respect to , and P is well typed with respect to the augmented environment which equates
the capabilities of u and v. The weaker requirement on P is reasonable because after the match u = v
these locations are known to be identical. Note that subtyping on channels is trivial, and therefore for
channel types this rule is no more powerful than the original rule (T-EQ). (However in the next section
such subtyping will be introduced.) Also recall that location types all have a common supertype “loc,”
and therefore the rule (T-EQ′) can be applied to any match between location names simply by taking L
and K to be loc, although in this case there is also no advantage to using (T-EQ′) over the old rule (T-EQ).
Advantage is only obtained when the types to which it is applied are nontrivial location types.
FIG. 8. An improved type system.
104 HENNESSY AND RIELY
The new type system would be useless if it were not sound. All of the results from Sections 4.2 and
4.4 also apply to the improved type system. We state only subject reduction and type safety below. For
proofs see the Appendix.
THEOREM 5.1 (Subject reduction, type safety).
(a) If  ′ N and N → N ′ then  ′ N ′.
(b) If  ′ N and N → N ′ then  ′ N ′.
(c)  ′ N implies (N ) err−→/ .
EXAMPLES. Revisiting example (*), we see that to derive  ′ R it is suff cient to establish:
,(z1) {z1 : loc{d, x1}},(z2) {z2 : loc{x2}} ′ if z1 = z2 then go z1.d!〈x1, x2〉.
Now using the new rule (T-EQ′) this can be reduced to
, z1 : loc{d, x1, x2}, z2 : loc{d, x1, x2} ′ go z1.d!〈x1, x2〉
which is straightforward to establish, assuming the constraints of (**).
The augmented type system is also needed in order to type the “remote channel creation” code
reported in Example 3.4 of Section 3. There we presented an encoding of
T(h)⇐ go .(νa, b) go h.P (†)
as:
T(h) ⇐ (νr )go .(νa, b) go h.r !〈(a, b)@ 〉
| r?((x, y)@z) if z =  then P{|(x, z)@z/(a, d)@|}. (‡)
Using the type system of Section 4.2, the fact that (†) is well typed does not guarantee that (‡) is
well typed; using (T-EQ′), however, this property can be established. The routed forwarding example
(Example 3.5) also requires the improved type system.
In fact there are many cases in which it is useful for an agent to accumulate knowledge of the
capabilities of a location as computation proceeds. This appears to be essential for coding certain types
of programs in a language such as ours where access to distributed resources is controlled using explicit
capabilities.
As a particularly simple example, consider a server agent that provides information about a freshly
created location piecemeal:
k(ν : loc{a, b, c}) d!〈a@〉 e!〈b@〉 f !〈c@〉.
Here the server creates a new location  with three local methods a, b, and c and gradually exports
knowledge of  and its resources, one at a time, on the public channels d , e, and f . A client of such a
server, knowing to expect this trickle of information, might take the form:
kd?(x1@z1) e?(x2@z2) if z1 = z2 then f ?(x3@z3) if z1 = z3 then Q.
As communication with the server agent proceeds, the client gets more and more capabilities at .
6. TYPE EXTENSIONS
In this section we show how to extend our results to a richer type system with nontrivial subtyping
on channel types. Following Pierce and Sangiorgi [26], channel subtyping is def ned using read and
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FIG. 9. Extended pretypes.
write capabilities. Our requirement that all types be FBC, however, forces us to follow a more general
approach than that of [26]. Examples of the use of these extended types may be found toward the end
of the section.
Types and Subtyping. The def nition of extended pretypes is given in Fig. 9, where we explicitly
introduce syntactic categories for location capabilities κ-λ and channel capabilities α-β. We def ne
types below, after discussing subtyping.
In the extended language we will require explicit capabilities to perform operations on locations;
thus the set of location capabilities is extended from that of Section 4. The new capabilities are:
• go, the ability to move to the location, and
• newc, the ability to create a new local channel.
In other languages, such as that considered in [27], further capabilities might be def ned, such as the
capability to halt or migrate a location or the ability to create sublocations.
Since we allow subtyping on channel types the def nition of subtyping on location typesmust general-
ize that of previous sections. There, subtyping corresponded to reverse subset inclusion on capabilities.
For the extended type system, we have that K <: L if for every capability λ ∈ L there exists a capability
κ ∈ K which is “at least as good”; i.e., κ <: λ. Here the location capabilities κ and λ are compared
inductively using the associated types; e.g., a:A <: a : B if A <: B.
We also def ne capabilities for channels, which may be interpreted as follows:
• r〈T〉 grants permission for an agent to receive values v from a channel and then to use each v
with at most the permissions specif ed by T; and
• w〈S〉 grants permission for an agent to send values v into a channel, as long as that agent has,
on each v sent, at least the permissions specif ed by S.
Subtyping for channels is just as for locations: A<: B if for every capability β ∈B there exists
a capability α ∈A such that α <:β. But the subtyping relation on channel capabilities is more
interesting:
r〈T〉 <: r〈T′〉 if T<: T′
w〈S〉 <: w〈S′〉 if S′ <: S.
As one should expect from the intuitive descriptions given above, the read capability is covariant,
whereas the write capability is contravariant. Thus a receiver can always take fewer capabilities than
specif ed by T, whereas a sender can always send more capabilities than specif ed by S.
DEFINITION 6.1 (Extended types).
(a) A location pretype K is a type if a:A ∈ K and a:A′ ∈ K imply A = A′.
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(b) A channel pretype A is a type if:
r〈T〉 ∈ A and r〈T′〉 ∈ A imply T=T′
w〈S〉 ∈ A and w〈S′〉 ∈ A imply S= S′
r〈T〉 ∈ A and w〈S〉 ∈ A imply S<: T
and S, T are in turn types.
(c) Pretypes of the form T˜ and A˜@K are types if their constituent components are types.
As before, location types are allowed at most one capability for each channel. Channel types are also
constrained to have at most one read and one write capability. The f nal constraint on channel types is
a consistency requirement. It prevents agents from fabricating capabilities. For example, it prevents an
agent from sending a value at type loc{a:A} and then receiving the same value at type loc{a:A, b:B}.
We discuss this further after presenting the soundness theorem for the typing system.
Note that loc{ } (often abbreviated to loc) is a supertype of every simple location type and res{ } is
a supertype of every channel type.
Simple and “PS” Types. The extended types include the simple types studied in Sections 4 and
5. The simple channel type res〈T〉 is here identif ed with the type res {w 〈T〉, r〈T〉}. On simple types,
the subtyping relation of Fig. 9 degenerates to that of Fig. 4. To establish res{w〈T〉, r〈T〉} <: res{w〈S〉,
r〈S〉} it is required that both T <: S and S <: T; therefore T and S must be identical.
Readers who are familiar with [26] will notice that Pierce and Sangiorgi’s channel types—“PS”
types—are also representable in our type system (ignoring recursion). The PS read type [T]r is identif ed
with res{r〈T〉}, the PS write type [T]w is identif ed with res{w〈T〉}, and the PS read/write type [T]rw is
identif ed with res{w〈T〉, r〈T〉}. For these PS types, our def nition of subtyping coincides with that of
Pierce and Sangiorgi.
Our channel types include many types that are not def nable using the system of Pierce and Sangiorgi,
however. For example, the type
C = res{r〈loc{a:A}, w〈loc{a:A, b:B}〉}
is not expressible as a PS type. Nonetheless, it is easy to see how such types arise when agents are
granted different permissions on the names in a system. Say that agent N has a channel c at type C. The
type of the channel allows N to use channel a at locations that it reads from c. Other agents, however,
may have been granted additional permissions on c. For example, agent M may be able to use both
channels a and b at locations read from c. Thus, if N wishes to send a location k on c, it is required that
N know that both a and b are def ned at k; thus N must have permissions for both a and b at k. This is
true even though N itself cannot read k from c into a variable z and then immediately use channel b at z.
Finite Bounded Completeness. Before we can adapt the typing rules of Fig. 8 to this new language
for types or describe the tagged language, we must f rst def ne a partial meet operator  and thus prove
that the subtype relation is FBS. Because the type system has a contravariant operator, the def nition of
meet  requires that the type language also has a join unionsq.
The def nitions of the partial meet and join operators are given in Fig. 10. To make the def nitions
more readable, we write types simply as sets of capabilities, dropping the res and loc. We also write
“a : –/∈K” as shorthand for “there exists no A such that a:A ∈ K.” Similarly, “r〈−〉 /∈ A” is shorthand
for “there exists no T such that r〈T〉 ∈ A.” Also, let γ range over the set {go, newc} of primitive
capabilities.
The def nition is long, but it is not complicated, simply tedious. Intuitively, themeet of two types takes
the union of their capabilities, whereas the join takes the intersection. In the case that two types have
conf icting capabilities, the meet is undef ned. On the other hand, the join simply ignores conf icting
capabilities, leaving them out. For example, suppose that we are looking at two incompatible channel
types, one of which has the capability to read pairs and the other which has the capability to read triples.
The meet is undef ned; it is not possible have a channel that can read both pairs and triples. The join is
def ned, but does not include a read capability.
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FIG. 10. Partial meet and join operators for extended types.
On channels, in order for {r〈T〉, w〈S〉}  {r〈T′〉, w〈S′〉} to be def ned, the types must satisfy the follow-
ing constraints. (In the f gure, arrows indicate inclusion in the subtype relation; i.e., “S → T” means
“S <: T.”)
As an example of the use of these operators, consider the following:
L = loc{go, a :A, b : B} A = res{w〈loc{d : D, e : E}〉, r〈loc{d : D}〉}
K = loc{go, a :A′, c : C} A′ = res{w〈loc{d : D, f : F}〉}.
Then we have:
L  K = loc{go, a:(A  A′), b : B, c : C}
L unionsq K = loc{go, a:(A unionsq A′)}
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A  A′ = res{w〈loc{d : D}〉, r〈loc{d : D}〉}
A unionsq A′ = res{w〈loc{d : D, e : E, f : F}〉}.
PROPOSITION 6.2. The operator  defined in Fig. 10 is a partial meet operator.
Proof. By induction on the def nition of  one can establish that  and unionsq are commutative and
associative. Therefore, to establish the result we need only show that for every type T, S, R :
(a) R <: T and R<: S imply T  S def ned and R<: T  S
(b) T <: R and S <: R imply T unionsq S def ned and T unionsq S <: R
(c) T  S def ned implies T  S<: T
(d) T unionsq S def ned implies T <: T unionsq S.
First note that <:,  and unionsq are only def ned for structurally similar types. The properties (a)–(d)
may therefore be established using structural induction. (a) and (b) must be proved together as a single
induction hypothesis; likewise (c) and (d). The most interesting case is for channels. We describe this
case for each of the four properties.
(a) Suppose that A′′<: A andA′′<: A′.Wemust show that AA′ is def ned and that A′′<: AA′.
The proof proceeds by case analysis on the capabilities in A and A′. We treat the most diff cult case,
in which A and A′ each contain both read and write capabilities; the other cases can immediately be
derived from this one. Let:
A = res{r〈T〉, w〈S〉}
A′ = res{r〈T′〉, w〈S′〉}
A′′ = res{r〈T′′〉, w〈S′′〉}.
Using the assumption (A′′ →A and A′′ →A′), the induction hypothesis, and the fact that A′′ is a type,
we have:
One can easily check that the conditions for def nedness of meet at channel types (Fig. 10) are satisf ed
for A  A′, and thus:
A  A′ = res{r〈T  T′〉, w〈S unionsq S′〉}.
From (*) it follows that r〈T′′〉<: r〈T  T′〉 and w〈S〉<:w〈S unionsq S′〉. Thus A′′ <:A  A′, as required.
(b) Assume that A <:A′′ and A′ <:A′′. We must show that AunionsqA′ <:A′′; i.e., if α ∈ A′′ then there
exists a β ∈ A unionsq A′ such that β <:α. Suppose that A′′ contains a read capability r 〈T′′〉. Then by the
assumption we have that for some T and T′:
r〈T〉 ∈ A T <: T′′
r〈T′〉 ∈ A′ T′ <: T′′.
By induction, T unionsq T′ is def ned and T unionsq T′ <: T′′. Therefore r〈T unionsq T′〉 ∈ A unionsqA′. Using the def nition of
capability subtyping, we also have r〈T unionsq T′〉 <: r〈T′′〉, as required.
The argument is similar when A′′ contains a write capability w〈S′′〉.
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(c) Suppose that AA′ is def ned. We show that AA′ <: A. Suppose that w〈S〉 ∈ A; we must
show that A  A′ has a write capability dominated by w 〈S〉. There are two possibilities to consider.
(a) First, suppose that A′ contains no write capability (w〈−〉 /∈ A′). Then, by def nition w〈S〉 ∈ AA′,
and the proof is done. (b) Otherwise it must be that for some S′, w〈S′〉 ∈ A′. Since A  A′ is def ned,
it must be that S unionsq S′ is def ned, and therefore w〈S unionsq S′〉 ∈ A  B. By induction, S <: S unionsq S′ and thus
w〈S unionsq S′〉 <: w〈S〉, as required.
The argument is similar when A contains a read capability r〈S〉.
(d) Suppose that A unionsq A′ is def ned. We show that A <: A unionsq A′. Suppose that w 〈S′′〉 ∈ A unionsq A′.
Therefore it must be that for some S, S′′:
S′′ = S unionsq S′ w〈S〉 ∈ A w〈S′〉 ∈ A′.
By induction, S unionsq S′ <: S. Thus, w〈S〉 <: w〈S unionsq S′〉, as required.
The argument is similar when A unionsq A′ contains a read capability r〈T′′〉.
We now demonstrate that no partial meet operator exists for PS types. To make the counterexample
readable, let us use the following abbreviations:
r〈T〉 = res{r〈T〉} w〈T〉 = res{w〈T〉} rw〈T〉 = res{w〈T〉, r〈T〉}.
There are three PS types of the form io〈 〉, where io is an “i/o tag” (io ::= r |w| rw). These are ordered
by subtyping as follows, where we drop the f nal empty brackets, writing “io” instead of “io〈 〉”:
Next, consider types of the form io〈io′〈 〉〉:
Already here we can see that the type system is not FBC. For example the types r 〈r〉 and w 〈rw〉 have
lower bounds, but they have no greatest lower bound: rw〈r〉 and rw〈rw〉 are incomparable.
The Typing System. The typing relation  ′′ N is def ned in Fig. 11. The new typing system
has exactly the same rules for values (and most of the same rules for systems) as Fig. 5. The new
rules for input, output, movement, and channel creation are stronger than the old rules: they require
explicit capabilities for each of these actions. Because restriction is treated structurally, we must also
strengthen the rule for channel creation. (Without the stronger rule, subject reduction fails for the
structural equivalence.) But for location creation the rule remains the same as before. The rule for
matching names is as in the previous section; this is now useful for channel names since they support
nontrivial subtyping, unlike in the previous section.
The extended typing system has a corresponding notion of extended runtime error, presented in
Fig. 12. Here we use the partial functions “robj” and “wobj” which, given a channel type, return the
types of the objects that may read or be written on the channel, if these capabilities are def ned:
robj(A)
def= T, if r〈T〉 ∈ A wobj(A) def= S, if w〈S〉 ∈ A
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FIG. 11. Extended typing system.
Finally, to def ne tagged reduction we must also make a small change to the structural equivalence
on tagged terms, in line with the change to the typing rules for systems. (No changes are required to the
def nition of reduction for untagged terms.) The agent  (va : A)P is only allowed to create a at 
if it has the newc permission at ; therefore, the rule (ST-NEW) is replaced with the following two rules
that for channel creation have this requirement as a side condition:
(ST-CHAN
′′)  (va : A)P ≡ (v a : A) P,(a){a:A} if a /∈ fn(), ( ) <: loc{newc}
(ST-LOC
′′)  (vk : K)P ≡ (v k : K) P,(k){ k:K } if k /∈ fn()∪ { }.
Using these def nitions we have the standard subject reduction and type safety theorems, which are
proved in the Appendix.
THEOREM 6.3 (Soundness).
(a) If  ′′ N and N → N ′ then  ′′ N ′.
(b) If  ′′ M and M → M ′ then  ′′ M ′.
(c)  ′′ M implies M err−→/ .
FIG. 12. Extended runtime errors.
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The requirement that read and write capabilities on a channel must not conf ict (if both are def ned)
is essential for the validity of the theorem. Suppose two agents share a channel c at  with type
C= res{w〈Aw〉, r〈Arw〉}, where Arw = res {w〈T〉, r〈T〉} and Aw = res{w〈T〉} for some T. Note that this
is not a valid type (and thus are not allowed by our type system) because the read and write capabilities
conf ict (Arw <: Aw). If we did allow such types, however, then we could f nd , y and Q such
that:
 ′′  c!(a){..., : loc{c:C,a:Aw,... }}| c?(x : Arw) x?(y) Q{..., : loc{c : C}}.
But it is easy to see that this tagged term leads to a runtime error due to rule (E-COMM′′); the type of the
sent value and the type of the received value do not match. It is appropriate that an error should occur
here. The result of the communication,  a?(y) Q{... , : loc{c : C,a : Arw}}, is clearly undesirable, since the
read capability on a has been fabricated. Note that if (a) = Aw, then subject reduction also fails as a
result of this communication.
Example. As an example of the use of these extended types, consider a server for read/write (get/put)
cells similar to the counter server from Section 3.
S(h) ⇐ ∗req?(y@z) (νcell : Lcell) z.y!〈cell〉 | go cell.Cell(cell, 0)
Here “Cell” represents the code for the cell, for example:
Cell(h, n) ⇐ (νs : int) s!〈n〉 | ∗ g?(y@z) s?(x) (s!〈x〉| z.y!〈x〉)
| ∗ p?(y@z, v) s?(x) (s!〈v〉| z.y!〈 〉).
Let us use the abbreviations for PS types introduced above. The allocation type Lcell of the cell location
cell can then be written:
Lcell = loc{go, newc , g : rw〈Tg〉, P : rw〈Tp〉}
Tg = w〈int〉@loc{go}
Tp = (w〈 〉@loc{go}, int).
Location cell must be given at least the type Lcell in order for the cell code to typecheck (it may also be
given a subtype). Note that the channels g and p must be declared with both read and write capabilities
as the server reads from them and a user must be able to write to them. The cell requires only the write
capability on the response channels it receives on p and g.
The user’s capabilities on the cell are determined by the transmission type Treq of channel req (which
must have type rw〈Treq〉). If one takes
Treq = w〈L′cell〉@loc{go}
L′cell = loc{go, g :w〈Tg〉, p :w〈Tp〉}
then this type ensures that a cell user cannot redef ne the methods p or g (by intercepting messages sent
on these channels), nor can it create new channels at the cell location.
To emphasize this point consider the following user:
U(h) ⇐ (νr ) serv.req!〈r@h〉 | r?(z) U′(h, z).
U requests a cell using the response channel r . Then the system S(serv) | U(k) can reduce to
S(serv) | (νcell : Lcell) U′(k, cell) | Cell(cell).
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If Treq is as above, then one can be sure that the agent U(k, cell) has restricted access to cell in this
system. For example, if U′ has the form
U′(h, cell) ⇐ go cell.p?(x) . . .
then U(k) will be untypable. Viewed as a tagged system, one can see this def nition of U′ will also cause
a runtime error. After receiving the cell, the tagged user is of the form
kgo cell.p?(x) . . . {... ,cell : loc{go, g:w 〈Tg〉,p:w 〈Tp〉}}.
Clearly this agent will produce a runtime error when it attempts to read on p.
We should point out that this typing also affords some level of protection to the user. The response
channel r is sent to the server withwrite capability only; thus the servermay not intercept othermessages
that the user may wish to receive on r . Perhaps more important, the user’s location is sent without the
privilege to create new channels there, keeping the server from performing any computation at the user’s
location.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Summary. We have presented a typing system for controlling the use of resources in languages
that describe mobile agents. The typing system has been developed for a distributed version of the
π -calculus in which agents are located terms of the ordinary π -calculus and resources are channels
which agents use to communicate. A central assumption of the type system is that every resource is f xed
to a particular location, whereas agents are free to move from one location to another. This assumption
has led us to def ne the notions of location type and location subtyping which we believe to be novel.
We have developed the typing system in stages. The f rst typing system used a language of simple
types in which the only nontrivial types were locations. The second typing system was also def ned over
simple types, but was more permissive than the f rst, allowing agents to use simultaneously capabilities
acquired from disparate sources. The third and f nal typing system used an extended type language
which supported subtyping on resource types (i.e., channel types). Another development of these types,
to ensure receptiveness of channel names, can be found in [5].
Crucial in the development of the typing systems has been the presence of a partial meet operator at
all types. The need for such an operator forced us to abandon the notion of resource types proposed by
Pierce and Sangiorgi [26] in favor of more general types.
The usefulness of the typing systems has been shown by introducing a tagged language in which
agents are annotatedwith their capability sets. The tagged language and the associated reduction relation
appear to be novel.
Theπ -calculus [23] itself is a language for resource access control, using themechanismsof restriction
and scope extrusion to regulate the availability of resources. Distributed π -calculi such as Dπ inherit
the same mechanisms, so one might wonder why location types are needed at all. The ultimate goal of
our work is to provide a semantics for partially typed systems in which locations need only consider
local resources when type-checking incoming agents. Obviously, to def ne such a system, the notion of
local resource must be clearly understood, leading us to def ne location types. In this paper, we have
attempted to fully explore the properties of location types using various type systems and examples.
Although we have not here def ned a typing system that meets this ultimate goal, we feel we have laid
adequate foundations. Preliminary investigations toward useful partial typing systems, based on the
ideas developed in the current paper, have been reported in [18, 28].
Related Work. There are numerous languages now in the literature for describing distributed sys-
tems; Dπ is perhaps closest in spirit to [3, 6, 13, 29, 32, 33] which also take as their point of departure the
π -calculus , although with each there are signif cant differences. For example in the join calculus [13]
message routing is automatic as the restricted syntax ensures that all channels have a unique location
at which they are serviced. In Dπ , to send a message to a remote location, an agent must f rst spawn a
subagent which moves to that location; locations are more visible in Dπ . In Nomadic Pict [33] threads
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are named (called agents in [33]) and may move from site to site; however, resources belong to agents
rather than, as in Dπ , sites. In addition, several of these languages [6, 13, 29] adopt location movement
as the mechanism for agent mobility.
Many channel-based typing systems for π -calculi and related languages have been proposed. For
example in [26], discussed at length in Section 6, Pierce and Sangiorgi def ne a type system for the
π -calculus with read and write capabilities on channels. Sewell [29] generalizes the type system of
[26] to distinguish between local communication, which can be eff ciently implemented, and nonlocal
communication. Fournet et al. [14] have developed an ML-style typing system for the join calculus
where channels are allowed a certain amount of polymorphism. Amadio [3] has presented a type system
that guarantees that channel names are def ned at exactly one location, whereas the type system of
Kobayashi et al. [21] ensures that some channels are used linearly.
The work closest to ours is that of de Nicola et al. [10]. Their goals are the same as ours, but the
specif cs of their solution are quite different. They work with a variant of Linda [9] with multiple tuple
spaces. Tuple spaces correspond to locations in our setting, and tuples (named data) correspond to
resources. The type system of [10] controls access to tuple spaces, rather than specif c tuples. In order
to acheive the f ne level of control provided by our system, [10] requires that each resource be allocated
to a separate tuple space and that adjacency of resources be encoded in their types. Since types in
[10] encode an adjacency graph, they are both more general and substantially more complex than our
location types.
Static analyses for proving various security properties of programs have also been proposed by several
authors; two recent references are [17, 20].
Further Work. There are many directions in which our research could be extended. Perhaps the
most obvious is to allow recursive types in the various typing systems we have presented. To do so,
one would need to replace every instance of type equality in the paper with a weaker relation such as
bisimilarity [31] or equality up to unfolding [29]. We do not expect that the proofs of subject reduction
and type safety would be affected much by this change; nor do we foresee any diff culty in extending
the proof of f nite bounded completeness.
Amore diff cult issue is the inclusion ofmore sophisticated notions of code migration in our language.
Our notion of location, although not static, is one dimensional. In languages such as the join calculus
[13], Ambients [6], and the Seal calculus [32], locations are hierarchical, in the sense that locations
may contain sublocations. In such languages, it is locations which move, rather than threads, and thus
agents are identif ed with locations, rather than threads. This has the advantage that agents may be
multi-threaded, and thus agents that may move at any time are easier to express. Providing type systems
for controlling access to resources in the presence of such location movement remains an interesting
challenge.
A. PROOFS
A.1. Proofs from Section 4.2
We f rst prove the weakening lemma. The result for systems, stated in the text, relies on similar results
for threads and values.
PROPOSITION 4.5.
(a) If   N and  <:  then   N.
(b) If  w P and  <:  then  w P.
(c) If  w v : T and  <:  then  w v : T.
Proof. All three results are proved, in a straightforward manner, by judgment induction (i.e., by
induction on the length of the type inference). We give one example for each result.
(a) (N-RUN) Suppose   P because   P . Using the auxiliary results we obtain   P .
Using (N-RUN), we have   P.
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(b) (T-R) Suppose  w u?(X : T) P because:
 w u : res〈T〉 and ,(X ) {w X : T} w P.
Since we identify terms up to alpha-equivalence, the variables inX can also be chosen to be new to, in
which case,(X ) {w X : T} is well def ned, and it is easy to see that (,(X ) {w X : T}) <: (,(X ) {w X : T}).
So we may apply induction to the above two statements to obtain:
 w u : res〈T〉 and ,(X ) {w X : T} w P.
The rule (T-R) may now be employed to infer  w u?(X : T) P as required.
(c) (V-LOCAL) Suppose w u : A because(w) <: loc{u : A}. Since<:  then by transitivity
we have (w) <: loc{u : A}. Using (V-LOCAL), one can the infer  w u : A, as required.
As corollaries we immediately have the following:
COROLLARY A.1.
(a) If   N then ,(v) {wv : T}  N.
(b) If ,(v) {wv : S}  N and T<: S then ,(v) {wv : T}  N.
Proposition 4.5 states that well-typing is preserved when the typing environment is augmented. It is
also preserved when the typing environment is decreased by omitting all occurrences of identif ers that
do not occur free in the system being typed. Let \u denote the result of eliminating u from ; i.e.,
(\u)(u) is undef ned and (\u)(w, u) is undef ned for everyw. For any syntactic element t , let “f d(t)”
return the free identif ers in t .
LEMMA A.2 (Restriction).
(a) If   N and u /∈ f d(N ) then \u  N.
(b) If  w P and u /∈ f d(P) ∪ {w} then \u w P.
(c) If  w u : S and u /∈ f d(u) ∪ {w} then \u w u : S.
Proof. In each case the result follows by a straightforward judgment induction. We leave the details
to the interested reader.
As a corollary we have that typing is preserved by scope extrusion:
COROLLARY A.3. Suppose e does not appear free in M. Then   (νe)(M | N ) if and only if  
M | (νe)N.
Proof. We examine the case when e is a channel; the case in which e is a location is similar.
Suppose   (νa : A)(M | N ). Then using (N-NEW) and (N-STR), we have that ,(a) {a : A}  M and
,(a) {a : A}  N . Applying Lemma A.2 to the f rst of these we obtain (,(a) {a : A})\a  M ; i.e.,
  M since a is new to . Applying (N-NEW) to the second statement we obtain   (νA)N and
therefore (N-STR) gives   M | (νa : A)N .
The converse uses the same arguments, in the reverse direction.
As a step toward proving subject reduction, note that closed terms are preserved by reduction.
LEMMA A.4. If N is closed and N → N ′ then N ′ is closed.
Proof. By induction on the judgment N → N ′.
The proof of subject reduction for the typing system depends, as is often the case, on a substitution
lemma. However in this case before the appropriate version can be proved we need the following
technical lemma.
LEMMA A.5.
(a) If   k : K and ,(z) {z : K}, (x˜){z x˜ : T˜} w P then ,(x˜) {k x˜ : T˜} w{|k/z|} P{|k/z|}.
(b) If   k : K and ,(z) {z : K}, (x˜){z x˜ : T˜} w u : S then ,(x˜) {k x˜ : T˜} w{|k/z|} u{|k/z|} : S.
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Proof. For both results the proof is similar. Informally the proof proceeds, in the case of threads,
by taking a derivation of the judgment ,(z) {z : K}, (x˜){z x˜ : T˜} w P , substituting k for z throughout,
and thereby obtaining a derivation of ,(x˜) {k x˜ : T˜} w{|k/z|} P{|k/z|}. Formally it is a straightforward
induction on type judgments. We omit the details.
Proof of the Substitution Lemma. We present the proof for the extended type system of Section 6.
For this proof only, we write  as shorthand for ′′. The proofs for the other type systems are somewhat
simpler.
LEMMA 4.7. For any closed value v:
(a) If  v v : T and ,(X ) {v X : T} w P then  w{|v/X |} P{|v/X |}.
(b) If  v v : T and ,(X ) {v X : T} w u : S then  w{|v/X |} u{|v/X |} : S.
Proof. Note that there is no corresponding substitution result for systems, because values must be
typed at a specif c location.
Throughout the proof we use primes to indicate terms in which the substitution has been performed;
i.e., for t an element of any syntactic category, t ′ denotes t{|v/X |}.
We f rst prove the result (b) for values. The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of X . There
are four cases: X may bew, X may be some identif er other thanw, or X may have the form X˜ or x˜@z.
First, suppose that X = w. Because X = w it must be that w′ = v = k for some k. We proceed by
induction on u to show that  k u′ : S.
• Suppose that u = w and therefore u′ = v = k. The second premise may be written
,(w) {vw : T} w w : S. Here we know that T <: S and therefore the result follows by applying
weakening to the f rst premise (  k : T).
• Suppose that u = u = w. The second premise may be written , (w) {vw : T} w u : S. There
are two possibilities. If S is a location type, we must have that (u) <: S and thus  k u : S. Otherwise
T must be of the form loc{u : S′, . . . } where S′ <: S. Since  v k : T we can therefore conclude that
 k u : S.
• In the other cases, u = u˜ : S˜ and u = b@ : B˜@L, the result follows using the innermost
induction.
Suppose, instead, that X = x = w. In this case it must be thatw′ = w. Again we proceed by induction
on u to show that  w u′ : S.
• Suppose that u = x and therefore u′ = v. Either S is a location type and so by the f rst premise
  v : S, or S is another type and so v must be equal tow and again the f rst premise gives the required
result  w v : S.
• Suppose that u = u = x . The result is immediate by applying the restriction lemma
(Lemma A.2) to the second premise.
• Again, the other cases follow by straightforward induction.
Suppose X = X˜ : T˜. Therefore v must have the form v˜ and by assumption we have that:
 v v˜ : T˜ and ,(x˜) {vX˜ : T˜} w u : S.
We can rewrite this as:
 v v1 : T1, . . . , vn : Tn and ,(x1) {vX1 : T1}, . . . ,(Xn ) {v Xn : Tn} w u : S.
Using induction we have:
,(X1) {v X1 : T1}, . . . ,((Xn−1) {v(Xn−1 : Tn−1)} w{|vn /Xn |} u{|vn /Xn |} : S.
Repeating this process n times yields  w′ u′ : S, as desired.
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Finally, suppose X = x˜@z : A˜@K. Therefore v must have the form a˜@k and by assumption we have
that:
 v a˜@k : a˜@K and , (a˜@k) {va˜@k : a˜@K} w u : S.
We can rewrite this as:
  k : K and  k a˜ : A˜ and , (z) {z : K}, (x˜) {z x˜ : A˜} w u : S.
Using Lemma A.5 we have:
,(x˜) {k x˜ : A˜} w{|k/z |} u{|k/z|} : S.
Applying induction yields  w′ u′ : S as desired.
Having established the result for values, we now prove the result (a) for threads:
 v v : T and , (X ) {vX : T} w P imply  w′ P ′.
Again we proceed by induction on the structure of X . The inductive cases are as before, so we only
present the base case where X is an identif er x . This case is established by a secondary induction on
the judgment ,(X ) {v X : T} w P . Most of the cases in the secondary induction are straightforward,
the exceptions being the cases for input and channel restriction. We show these two cases.
First consider the case for (T-R′′). Our proof obligation is to show:
 v v : T and ,(x) {vx : T} w u?(Y : S)Q imply  w′ u′?(Y : S) Q′. (∗)
There are two cases to consider, x = w and x = w. First suppose that x = w. Here T must be a location
type, say K, and therefore v must be a location name, say k. The premises in (*) may therefore be
written:
  k : K and ,(w) {w : K} w u?(Y : S)Q.
From (T-R′′) we have:
,(w) {w : K} w u : res{r〈S〉} and ,(w) {w : K},(Y ) {wY : S} w Q.
Using Lemma A.5 twice, we obtain:
 k u′ : res{r〈S〉} and ,(Y ) {kY : S} k Q′.
Finally, (T-R′′) can be applied to arrive at the desired conclusion,  k u′?(Y : S) Q′.
Continuing the case for (T-R′′), suppose x = w. This case is a standard application of induction. The
details are as follows. Using the second premise of (*) and (T-R′′), we can conclude that:
, (x) {vx : T} w u : res{r〈S〉} and , (x) {vx : T},(Y ) {wY : S} w Q.
Note that since w = x , we may rewrite the above as:
, (x) {vx : T} w u : res{r〈S〉} and , (Y ) {wY : S},(x) {vx : T} w Q.
Now we may use the inner induction to conclude:
 w u′ : res{r〈S〉} and ,(Y ) {wY : S} w Q′.
Therefore using (T-R′′) we have, as desired,  w u′?(Y : S)Q′.
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Now consider the case for channel restriction (T-NEWC′′). In this case the proof obligation is:
 v v : T and , (x) {vx : T} w (νa : A)Q imply  ′w (νa : A)Q′. (∗∗)
Using the second premise of (**) and (T-NEWC′′), we can conclude that:
,(x) {vx : T},(a) {wa : A} w Q. (∗∗∗)
At this point we must consider two cases, either x = w or x = w. First suppose that x = w.
Then (***) can be rewritten as , (a) {wa : A}, (x) {vx : T} w Q and we can apply induction to get
, (a) {wa : A} w′ Q′ and then (T-NEWC′′), since the second premise of (**) implies a ∈ fn() and
(w) <: loc{newc} to get  w′ (νa : A)Q′ as required.
On the other hand if x = w, then we must use Lemma A.5. Since x = w, it must be that v is a
location name and thus v = k and T = K for some k, K. We can therefore rewrite the f rst premise of
(**) and the statement (***) as:
  k : K and ,(w) {w : K}, (a) {wa : A} w Q.
These can be applied to Lemma A.5 to yield , (a){ka : A} k Q′ and thus, using (T-NEWC′′),  k
(νa : A) Q′ as required.
Proof of the Subject Reduction Theorem.
THEOREM 4.6.
(a) If N ≡ N ′ then   N if and only if   N ′.
(b) If N → N ′ then   N implies   N ′.
Proof. The f rst statement is proved by induction on the proof of N ≡ N ′. The main axiom, scope
extrusion (S-EXTR), is covered by Corollary A.3. The other axioms and rules are straightforward calcu-
lations left to the interested reader.
The second statement is proved by induction on the proof of N → N ′. The rule (R-STR) follows from
the f rst part; the remaining rules are, again, straightforward calculations. We give two examples.
• (R-GO) states  go u.P → kP. By supposition    go u.P. Then using (N-RUN) we have
  go u.P . Then using (T-GO),  k P and therefore by (N-RUN)   kP.
• (R-COMM) states  a!〈v〉P |  a?(X : T) Q →  P |  Q{|v/X |}. Suppose    a!〈v〉P |
 a?(X : T)Q. To satisfy the proof obligation, it is suff cient to show that   P and   Q{|x/X |}.
The f rst is easy to establish from the hypothesis, which entails   a!〈v〉P . Using the hypothesis and
the rules for typing it must also be that:
  v :T   a : res〈T〉   a : res〈T〉 , 〈X〉 { X :T}  Q.
Note here that v is a closed value. We can apply the substitution lemma to obtain   Q{|v/X |}, as
required.
A.2. Proofs from Section 4.4
In this section we prove the subject reduction theorem for the tagged language. We f rst present a
lemma characterizing the def nition {v : T}.
LEMMA A.6.
(a) { v : T}  v : T
(b)   v : T implies  <: { v : T}.
Proof. By induction on v, using the def nition of typing for values and the def nition of the notation
“{ v : T}.”
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THEOREM 4.8. For all tagged systems
(a) If N ≡ N ′ then   N if and only if   N ′.
(b) If N → N ′ then   N implies   N ′.
Proof. As in Theorem 4.6, the proof of (a) is straightforward by induction on the derivation of
N ≡ N ′. We show the argument for the rule (ST-NEW), applied to channels, which states
 (νa :A) P ≡ (ν a :A)  P, (a){ a:A}.
Suppose   (νa :A)P, and therefore <:  and  (νa :A) P . Then using (T-NEW), (a) { a :
A}  P , from which we obtain from (T-GO) that , (a) { a : A}  P. Since , (a) { a : A} <:
, (a) { a : A} we can apply the new typing rule for tagged agents, (N-RUN), to obtain , (a) { a : A} 
 P,(a){ a : A} and an application of (N-NEWC) gives the required   (ν a : A)  P,(a){ a:A}. The
argument in the other direction is much the same.
The proof of (b) is by induction on why N → N ′. The only nontrivial case is the communication rule
for tagged threads, (RT-COMM). So suppose
   a!〈v〉P |  a?(X : T) Q;
that is,   a!〈v〉P,   a?(X : T) Q and  <: ,  <: . We must show
   P |  Q{|v/X |}′ ,
where′ denotes { v : T}. Thus our proof obligations are three: we must show that   P, ′ 
Q{|v/X |}, and  <: ′.
Most of the required work has already been carried out in Theorem 4.6. The proof of   P is
identical, thus satisfying the f rst obligation.
Since  <:  and  <:  it follows that ( , a) and ( , a) must coincide at the type res〈T〉
(because there is no subtyping on channels). Using LemmaA.6bwe have { v :T}  v : T, and therefore
′  v : T, by weakening (Proposition 4.5). The hypothesis also implies ,(X ) { X : T}  Q and
thus, again by weakening we have ′, (x){ X : T}  Q. We can now use the substitution lemma to
obtain the second obligation, ′  Q{|v/X |}.
Using the premise and type rules we have   v : T; thus by weakening we have   v : T and
therefore  <: { v : T}, by Lemma A.6a. Using this and the fact that  <:  we obtain the third
obligation,  <: ′.
A.3. Proofs from Section 5
The proofs of the following results extend immediately to the improved type rules: type specialization
(Lemma 4.4), weakening (Proposition 4.5), substitution (Lemma 4.7), and tagged/untagged reduction
(Proposition 4.10).
THEOREM 5.1.
(a) If  ′ N and N → N ′ then  ′ N ′.
(b) If  ′ N and N → N ′ then  ′ N ′.
(c)  ′ N implies N err−→/ .
Proof. The new type rules do not affect terms that can be shown to be structurally equivalent and
therefore the results for the structural equivalences follow from Theorems 4.6 and 4.8. The proof of (c)
is also unchanged from that of Theorem 4.12.
Both (a) and (b) follow by induction on the def nition of reduction. The argument is much as in
Theorems 4.6 and 4.8. The only case which changes is that for successful matching location names. We
treat the untagged case; the tagged case is similar. The reduction rule (R-EQ1) states:
 if u = u then P else Q →  P.
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So suppose  ′  if k = k then P else Q. This must be typed using (T-EQL′); thus we have that for
some T, S,  ′ u : T,  ′ u : S, and   {u : T, u : S} ′ P . This must mean that (k) <: S and
(k) <: T; thus (k) <: T  S. It follows from weakening (Proposition 4.5) that  ′  P.
A.4. Proofs from Section 6
The proofs of the following results extend immediately to the extended type system: type special-
ization (Lemma 4.4), weakening (Proposition 4.5), substitution (Lemma 4.7), and tagged/untagged
reduction (Proposition 4.10).
THEOREM 6.3.
(a) If  ′′ N and N → N ′ then  ′′ N ′.
(b) If  ′′ M and M → M ′ then  ′′ M ′.
(c)  ′′ M implies M err′′−→/ .
Proof. The proof of the result for the structural congruence in Theorem 4.6 extends directly to both
the tagged and the untagged languages.
The proofs of (a) and (b) are, as usual, by induction on the def nition of reduction. We discuss the
untagged case. The only interesting case is (R-COMM), which states:
 a!〈v〉P |  a?(X : T) Q →  P |  Q{|v/X |}.
Suppose  ′′  a!〈v〉P |  a?(X : T) Q. To satisfy the proof obligation, it is suff cient to show
that  ′′ P and  ′′ Q{|v/X |}. The f rst is easy to establish from the supposition, which entails
 ′′ a!〈v〉P . Using the supposition it must also be that for some S:
 ′′′ v : S  ′′′ a : res{w〈S〉}  ′′ a : res{r〈T〉} ,(X ){ X : T} ′′ Q.
By the rules on valid types it must be that S <: T. And therefore by type specialization,  ′′ v : T. We
can now apply the substitution lemma to obtain  ′′ Q{|v/X |}, as required.
To prove (c), we proceed as in Theorem 4.12, proving the contrapositive (that M err
′′−→ implies for
no  can we prove  ′′ M) by induction on the def nition of M err′′−→. As before each of the cases is
straightforward, the new rules in Fig. 7 presenting no additional diff culty. We omit the details.
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